The White House insists that Joe Biden wasn’t abandoning longstanding U.S. policy with his declaration that the U.S. would use military force to defend Taiwan from China. Many of his congressional allies are hoping otherwise.

The president’s advisers insisted that Biden’s comments during his swing through Asia this week weren’t signaling an evolution of America’s decadeslong approach to the Pacific island nation, a doctrine known as “strategic ambiguity.” But it wasn’t the first time that Biden’s staff had to clean up his remarks on the subject of defending Taiwan from Beijing.

And lawmakers see it as a sign that Russia’s war on Ukraine is pushing Biden to get more muscular toward China, despite reservations from his aides.

“There are some in the White House who may feel he went too far, but I think it was a helpful episode in showing the Chinese where his mind and heart were,” said Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), citing “recent experience with another bully” in Russia’s Vladimir Putin.

“The president is taking a lesson from Ukraine that a stronger initial position could be necessary for deterrence,” he added. “The bullies of the world need to know we’re going to take a stand. And if they don’t hear that message with clarity, they may mistake it for weakness.”

The Taiwan Relations Act has governed U.S. policy on the matter since its enactment in 1979. It established “strategic ambiguity,” which states that the U.S. will remain intentionally unclear about whether it would come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of an invasion from China. The country views Taiwan as part of its territory — much as Putin’s Russia has seen Ukraine — and thus refused to recognize its neighbor’s independence.

But recent developments have ignited debates across Washington about whether that policy remains the best deterrent to an invasion.

Biden’s comments Monday at the Quad Leaders’ Summit in Tokyo represented at least the third time since taking office that he has seemed to cast aside strategic ambiguity — only for anonymous White House aides to walk him back, hours later.

Lawmakers said the frequency of the episodes shows that despite the attempted clean up, Biden truly believes that deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan requires going beyond selling weapons to the U.S. ally. They say the U.S. needs to convey to China’s Xi Jinping that, like with Russia, there will be consequences for invading a sovereign neighbor.

And if that means abandoning strategic ambiguity, these members of Congress say, so be it.

“He keeps saying this because this is what he believes. It’s his reaction when asked the question on the spot — that, yes, we’ll come to their defense,” Rep. Elaine Luria (D-Va.) said in an interview. “The time for ambiguity is over … We need to say that, yes, if this happens this will be our intended response. That will better direct the decisions that are made.”

Luria, a retired Navy officer, raised eyebrows on the Hill last year when she advocated for sending Biden a preemptive authorization for the use of military force that would allow the president to respond to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan at a moment’s notice.

While there isn’t widespread support for such a move, lawmakers on both sides of the aisle are growing more comfortable with gutting “strategic ambiguity” as Beijing grows increasingly confrontational.

A Chinese invasion of Taiwan is “even more dangerous than the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in my opinion,” Sen. John Cornyn (R-Texas) said. “So we need to deter China and I think the best way to do that is to make clear what our intentions are. [Biden] basically said that, but then muddied the water again.”

Senate Foreign Relations Chair Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) noted in a brief interview Tuesday that the U.S. is already selling both offensive and defensive weapons to Taiwan to help bolster its military. He argued it’s not inconsistent with existing U.S. policy for Biden to declare that the U.S. “would act to its defense.”

“The president very often speaks from the heart,” added Menendez, who recently traveled to Taiwan and tweeted in support of Biden’s remarks on Monday: “Credible deterrence requires both courage and clarity.”

Republicans have diverged on whether the U.S. should provide more clarity on its position, but many slammed Biden this week for the mixed messaging and lamented what appears to be an ongoing debate inside the administration about how forcefully the U.S. should project its intentions.

GOP hawks in the upper chamber said Biden’s initial comments pledging to respond militarily to an invasion of Taiwan were correct.

“He shouldn’t have walked it back. It shows weakness,” said Sen. Todd Young (R-Ind.). “I actually think his instincts were strong, but that’s the sort of message that you want to get right, and I’m shocked he wasn’t better prepared.”

Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) said Biden “stumbled into what is the right policy for the United States.” Strategic ambiguity should be cast aside, Cotton contended, both because the Chinese now have the military capabilities to invade Taiwan and because Taiwan is a vibrant democracy — neither of which were the case when the U.S. policy was first developed.

“He needs to give a careful, deliberate speech from prepared text that is released in advance that states that the United States’ policy is to come to Taiwan’s aid if China attacks it — so no anonymous White House staffer can reverse it,” Cotton said in an interview. “Left where it is now, we get the worst of both worlds, provocation without deterrence.”

Many Republicans who were reluctant to support a $40 billion military and humanitarian aid package for Ukraine last week rationalized their votes in favor of the measure by arguing that it would send an unmistakable message to China, which lawmakers generally believe is a bigger long-term threat than Russia. Drawing parallels between the hot war in Russia-Ukraine and the long-simmering China-Taiwan conflicts convinced more Republicans who were initially wary of the price tag of the Ukraine package to vote for it.

Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, who pushed hard for the Ukraine aid bill, contended on Tuesday that “the single most important thing we can do to push back against President Xi is to help the Ukrainians beat Putin.”

“My suggestion to this administration [is to] sell to the Taiwanese the weapons they would need that are appropriate for any potential Chinese invasion,” McConnell said. “That is the single strongest thing we can do to help the Taiwanese, just like we’re helping the Ukrainians.”

Even as conservative Republicans and Democratic China hawks aligned to cheer Biden’s potential movement, though, other top Democrats dismissed the controversy over the president’s remarks. For some in his party, all Biden did was reaffirm the exact definition of the U.S. policy.

“In order to be strategically ambiguous, you sometimes actually have to be ambiguous,” Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) said in a brief interview. “You are watching strategic ambiguity in real time.”

The FDA’s top official will acknowledge a string of failures that contributed to the current infant formula shortages when he faces lawmakers on Capitol Hill on Wednesday.

In their prepared testimony released Tuesday evening, FDA Commissioner Robert Califf and several senior officials for the first time lay out a timeline of the agency’s response to reports last fall that infants had been hospitalized after consuming formula made at an Abbott Nutrition plant in Sturgis, Mich. And they say a whistleblower report alleging food safety problems at the plant, which was mailed in October, did not reach the FDA’s highest rungs until mid-February, despite being sent directly to then-acting Commissioner Janet Woodcock and others.

The Abbott plant was temporarily shut down in February, after an FDA inspection in January found five different strains of a potentially deadly bacteria known as Cronobacter sakazakii, the bacteria that sickened the four infants. Two of those infants died. At the same time, Abbott also issued a recall of some formula made at the plant, exacerbating a shortage of infant formula that began during the pandemic.

The FDA now finds itself at the center of a political firestorm over the shortages, which have sent parents scrambling for alternative sources. The need is particularly acute for infants and children who rely on specialty formulas due to health conditions — a growing number of infants with special dietary needs have been hospitalized.

Up until now, however, FDA officials declined to comment on why it took months between the first report of a bacterial infection linked to the plant last September, their inspection this winter, which turned up a range of food safety problems, and the recall. But the new details aren’t likely to tamp down the criticism of the agency, rather, they are already fueling further outrage from lawmakers.

“The FDA, at every step of this process, dropped the ball,” Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-Conn.), chair of the House Appropriations Committee, told POLITICO in an interview about the new details revealed in the testimony. “It put infants at risk.”

The FDA timeline laid out in the prepared testimony acknowledges the FDA didn’t hold interagency discussions about potential supply chain disruptions until Feb. 14, three days before the Abbott Nutrition plant at the center of the current shortages shut down and issued a formula recall. And the agency didn’t notify the Agriculture Department, which oversees a critical federal nutrition program that purchases about half of the nation’s infant formula, about potential disruptions until a week before the Abbott plant shut down. The program, known as WIC, serves 1.2 million infants from low-income families. Abbott supplies nearly half of all infant formula provided through WIC state contracts.

The testimony also blames “mailroom issues” for the fact that senior FDA officials, including Woodcock and FDA’s top food safety official, Susan Mayne, did not receive hard copies of the whistleblower report from last October detailing alarming concerns about the Abbott plant, including poor food safety practices and that officials there had falsified documents and intentionally information from FDA inspectors. The FDA did not interview the whistleblower until December.

According to Califf’s testimony, Woodcock and Mayne eventually received the whistleblower report via email from another FDA staffer on Feb. 14, three days before the recall. The agency says copies of the whistleblower report sent to Mayne and another FDA official were found in the FDA’s mailroom in May, but officials have yet to locate the copy sent to Woodcock. It was “likely due to COVID-19 staffing issues” and “a mailroom analysis is underway,” the prepared remarks state.

The FDA timeline does say other FDA officials overseeing infant formula and regulatory affairs received a copy of the 34-page report last October. Mayne and Frank Yiannas, FDA’s deputy commissioner for food policy and response, will testify alongside Califf on Wednesday. As POLITICO has reported, Mayne and Yiannas do not get along and it’s created tension at the senior levels of an agency already struggling to make decisions.

But Woodcock, whom Califf assigned to help oversee the agency’s food divisions in the midst of the formula fallout, will not appear before the committee.

Senior leaders at Abbott and two other major formula manufacturers will also testify before Congress on Wednesday.

DeLauro was not satisfied with the agency’s explanation for its slow response to the whistleblower report. “Take responsibility. If you are the director, if you are the acting director, then you have to know what the hell is going on,” said DeLauro, who has criticized the FDA for allowing Woodcock to also lead the internal review of its response.

“Who told staff that they could interview the whistleblower? You know what, let me step back a second, who’s in charge?” DeLauro added.

Califf’s testimony also addresses why it took the FDA until the end of January to begin its inspection of Abbott’s Sturgis plant, despite receiving warnings last fall. For several months after the initial reports of bacterial infections, Califf says the FDA struggled to match formula samples to the specific bacterium, which is known to grow in infant formula and cause rare but potentially fatal illnesses in babies. A Covid-19 outbreak among the plant’s staff in early January further pushed back the inspection’s launch.

When the FDA’s inspection team finally entered the plant on Jan. 31, they “observed significant operational deficiencies,” according to the testimony.

“The totality of evidence obtained during our inspection caused FDA to conclude that infant formulas produced at this plant were produced under insanitary conditions and may be contaminated with Cronobacter,” the testimony says. When the FDA got back positive samples of Cronobacter from the January inspection, Califf says they alerted Abbott and told the company it should issue a recall.

Despite the delays detailed in the timeline, the testimony argues that FDA “since the first day…has worked tirelessly with U.S. government partners to mitigate the supply chain disruption for both regular and specialty formulas.” But lawmakers have questioned why it wasn’t until May 16 that the FDA and Abbott agreed on a deal to reopen the Sturgis plant.

White House and USDA officials have privately complained about the FDA’s decision not to warn other parts of the administration earlier, while allowing the situation to grow into a food security crisis for American families and a political crisis for President Joe Biden, just months ahead of the November midterms.

The White House has also ducked questions about its own timeline in responding to the recall and ensuing shortages. Asked by POLITICO about when the FDA told the White House of the issues at the Sturgis plant and any concerns about potential shortages, a senior administration official said they would not comment on “internal communications.” “The recall became public on February 17 and we certainly have been very public about our activity in this space since then,” the official added.