Edward Lotterman
Disturbances in the force of the economy have been common in recent news. Prices of crypto currencies, especially bitcoin, did a deep-knee bends, ditto for gold and silver.
The Dow and S&P indexes are up setting records, and then down. Some foreign banks and countries apparently are reducing their holdings of U.S. dollars.
In a financial hangover from their bidding binge that raised farmland prices over 50% in five years, U.S. farmers want a large bailout. Housing prices remain out of reach for the children and grandchildren of baby boomers.
The common factor in all of this is the Federal Reserve (albeit acting in very good faith in response to successive defense, financial and health crises) increased the amount of money sloshing around relative to the size of the economy to unprecedented levels. The Fed, the media and many economists prefer to focus elsewhere — on the causes, not the results. And events will force us to do so.
If one wants to be prepared for that, it is necessary to understand banking — and central banking — from the ground up.
Start with the very basics. These were visible in Venice, Milan, Geneva and Amsterdam in the 1400s. Ditto in the Minnesota counties of Martin, Olmstead, Pipestone and others 150 years ago.
In all modern ages, some people have money that they save now so they can spend later. They want it safe and hope to earn some return on it in the meantime by investing. Others want to spend now. Some will have income in the future, but have no cash at the moment. They are willing to pay a fee to borrow spendable money today and pay it back later.
At some point in history, people started accepting money from people wanting to save and lending it to those who want to borrow. The borrowers pay interest, which is income for this intermediary. We call it a “bank” from the bench at which Italian merchants did business. A bank pays interest on deposits. The rate is low on small accounts or those with frequent deposits and withdrawals. It may be higher on larger amounts or to those who agree to leave alone for longer periods of time.
There are two dangers to any bank and its depositors. If some borrowers never repay their loans, a bank might not have cash to meet withdrawals by depositors. This would be “insolvency.” The bank is “busted” or “broke.” Even if the borrowers offer collateral, say real property like with a mortgage, the repossession or foreclosure process could take more time than the bank has to meet its depositors’ demand. To prevent this, its bank owners must have money of their own, capital, in the bank business as well as the funds of depositors. If a loan turns bad, the cushion of adequate capital plus the collateral protects depositors.
The second danger is that, even if all loans are safe and will be repaid when promised, a large number of depositors may suddenly want to withdraw their money. This flows from “mis-matched maturities.” Deposits can be demanded but loans may not be due until a ship returns from its voyage, wheat is harvested or the mercantile sells its large stock of calicos, coffee pots and pickaxes. This problem is “illiquidity,” or the lack thereof. Assets exceed liabilities but these assets cannot be converted into cash rapidly enough to satisfy withdrawals of deposits.
To guard against this, banks don’t lend out 100% of their deposits. If these total 10,000 dollars or guilders or ducats, wise bankers may lend out only 9,000 and keep 1,000 in reserve.
Having both adequate owners’ capital against insolvency and deposit reserves against illiquidity were voluntary prudence early in this historical evolution. But guilds of merchants in places like Venice or banking commissions in states like Minnesota eventually set uniform regulations. They may perform audits to ensure that rules are being followed.
Smaller banks also developed business relationships with larger banks. If a bank in Coblenz, Germany, had reserves greater than needed for prudence or legal compliance and no local borrowers, it might deposit money with a larger one in Amsterdam. One from Litchfield might put it in a Minneapolis bank. That Minneapolis bank or one from Des Moines or Lacrosse, with too much cash might place it with a still larger bank in Chicago or New York, and so on.
Moreover, funds might flow the other way. When Twin Cities banks were flush with cash from Dayton’s, Donaldsons and other merchants just finishing holiday sales, or from Cargill having shipped wheat to New York and Pennsylvania, they might lend it to smaller banks in Marshall or Chippewa Falls. These would lend to farmers facing spring planting needs for seed, new plows and additional horse feed.
Small town banks borrowing such cash temporarily unneeded by regional city banks had to put up collateral. This would be promissory notes signed by their own local customers. If a small town bank did not repay a Minneapolis bank, that larger one could collect directly from the farm or main-street borrower.
If a small bank had $20,000 in promissory notes signed by farmers and main street merchants and wanted to borrow from a Twin Cities bank, they knew they might be able to get only $19,000. The IOUs presented as collateral would be “discounted.” The office of the large bank that handled such deals was its “discount window.” The bigger bank would be the “correspondent bank” for the smaller one.
A city correspondent bank that had an established, trusted relationship with the small-town bank might be willing to help this client with cash if it faced illiquidity. And, after careful examination of books, it might be willing to advance funds to a small bank that actually faced going broke because one of its major borrowers defaulted on its debts. The larger bank might demand a temporary or permanent ownership share in the troubled bank in return for saving it from total failure.
All of this is commercial banking, all done with minimal government involvement. It first took place under rules of merchant-bank guilds and later under government banking laws. However, some large, major-city banks, say in London or Stockholm, gradually became dominant as bankers for smaller banks. They had few or no business customers themselves. Hence the rise of central banking, or what is known in America as the Fed.
Eventually these got special charters from government. The Riksens Ständers Bank (“Bank of the Estates of the Realm”) established in Stockholm in 1668, was directly run by the Swedish government. The Bank of England, chartered in London in 1694, was a private joint-stock business but one with special privileges and duties.
Governments created these entities to facilitate commerce. However, funding governments, especially for military operations, was an underlying need. The Swedish bank was established soon after a war with Russia at the end of the 1650s and facilitated the Great Northern War of shifting coalitions that engulfed the Baltic from 1700-1721. The Bank of England mobilized money for two decades of English wars against Louis XIV’s France.
The economies of the 13 American colonies were not complex. There were few true banks. Philadelphia, New York, and Boston had merchants who functioned much like those in Florence, Venice or Amsterdam centuries earlier. Tobacco, rice and indigo planters dealt directly with England through “factors,” or merchants, in London or Bristol. These sold their products, procured supplies and luxury goods, and wrote mortgages on their plantations and slaves when spenders like Thomas Jefferson lived beyond their means.
After independence, more banks regulated by individual states, if at all, were established. Out on the frontier west of the Alleghenies or north of the Ohio River, “wildcat banks” with little supervision but that could issue their own “banknote” currencies with little “backing” by gold or silver flourished. Failures were common. Deposits often disappeared, loans often not repaid. Regional inflations and deflations were common as were “panics” that slowed economic activity sharply causing much social pain.
This review of banking basics that are universal, plus some historical and institutional details for our country, facilitates understanding the challenges we face now.
The U.S. financial system, including its commercial banks, has been a source of true wealth for us. By “true wealth,” an economist means that we achieve high levels of satisfaction of the needs and wants of our people from resources we have available. But in recent decades, our financial system has become more erratic, “needing” more frequent and larger government intervention to stave off possible catastrophes. Exactly how and why that is playing out is something to explore next week.
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St. Paul economist and writer Edward Lotterman can be reached at stpaul@edlotterman.com.



