ICE Contractor for Controversial Camp East Montana Is Trailed by Fraud Allegations

posted in: All news | 0

Inside a cluster of windowless tents, detainees describe losing their sense of time as they spend weeks and even months beneath the flicker of industrial lightbulbs. 

Camp East Montana—the largest immigrant detention facility in the country—has quickly become a symbol of the second Trump administration’s aggressive approach to immigration enforcement. Located on the Fort Bliss military base in El Paso, the 5,000-bed center began receiving detainees last August. Since then, immigrant detention levels have surged to over 65,000 individuals nationwide, with thousands of people held in Camp East Montana in an environment where frequent beatings and severe neglect have been documented by a leading humanitarian organization. 

At least three people have died while detained at Camp East Montana in the past year, including a 55-year-old father whose death on January 3 was ruled a homicide after security guards beat him, according to reporting by the Texas Tribune. And, in February, an inspection report found dozens of violations of national detention standards, including 22 deficiencies related to “use of force” incidents.

Weeks later, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) ended a $1.26 billion contract with Camp East Montana’s former lead contractor, Acquisition Logistics, a small, veteran-owned business registered to a single-family home in Virginia. As a replacement, the agency tapped Amentum Services, a publicly traded multi-billion dollar company and a major player in federal contracting, which had begun as a subcontractor at Camp East Montana before assuming management of the facility in April.

In late July, a federal contract notice showed ICE decided to extend Amentum’s contract, potentially placing the contractor at Camp East Montana through September 2027, without the agency having taken bids from other companies and despite allegations of fraud and wage theft that have followed Amentum over its time as a government contractor. The extension for the next 12 months is worth over $776 million. Amentum has faced numerous lawsuits from labor unions and former employees, and it is actively fighting a whistleblower in court over allegations that it inflated the cost of services it provided to an Afghan refugee program in 2021 in order to make a higher profit off a valuable federal contract.

The agency’s extension also comes on the heels of an independent audit in June by the federal Government Accountability Office (GAO), which found that the web of contractors operating the facility spent up to about $19 million on unused services over a 7-month period, including payments for meals before the first detainees arrived.

Camp East Montana in January (Paul Ratje/The New York Times/Redux)

The contract to manage Camp East Montana draws from an unprecedented $45 billion funding package from Congress which was approved last year. In the rush to expand immigrant incarceration nationwide, lawyers and civil rights groups say the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has created an environment prone to opportunism. 

The department expanded operations at a dramatic scale without including some of the conditions typically required in prior contracts, such as clear oversight mechanisms and financial penalties for contract violations, according to Claire Trickler-McNulty, a former ICE official with knowledge of DHS contracts under prior administrations.  

Under past administrations, tighter budgets forced DHS to prioritize where funds were allocated. But, with an influx of billions of dollars earmarked specifically for immigration enforcement, “money is no longer an object,” Trickler-McNulty said. 

She also pointed to the recent dismantling of two internal DHS offices that were established to inspect civil rights violations, which she said has limited the number of “external people going to the facility and taking an independent look.”  

According to Nayna Gupta, an immigration attorney and the policy director of the American Immigration Council, Congress is essentially writing “blank checks to agencies” with few accountability or oversight mechanisms to evaluate spending—creating a context where “there’s more money available than ever before” to go to private contractors.

“If private contractors want to whittle down on medical services in a facility, want to shortchange sanitation in a facility in order to pocket more of the money that came to them in the contract, there are very few folks at the federal level in Congress really watching how they move because there were never any meaningful requirements for those contracts in the first place,” Gupta said. 

When ICE awarded the original Camp East Montana contract to Acquisition Logistics in July 2025, the contract was written without a Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP), which allows the government to put monetary sanctions for any violations of the contract. ICE and Army officials told the GAO, which identified the lack of oversight, a QASP was not included in the contract because of the “expedited time frames for opening the facility,” the GAO report said.

Since the 2010s, Amentum—including its corporate predecessors and numerous subsidiaries—has faced numerous lawsuits from labor unions and former employees. The contractor is currently fighting a whistleblower in court over allegations that it inflated the cost of services it provided to an Afghan refugee program in 2021 in order to make a higher profit off a valuable federal contract.

The lawsuit was brought against Amentum in 2023 under the False Claims Act, alleging that Amentum and affiliated subcontractors used a mechanism called “contract stacking” to artificially inflate the costs associated with services they provided for a federal Afghan refugee program at a military base in New Jersey.

“Contract stacking is one of the unfortunate ways that government contractors pump up what the government pays,” said Charles Tiefer, who served on the federal Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

In an interview, Tiefer said government contractors often use an opaque chain of subcontracts, hiring contractors performing various services on the same government project. That practice can enable companies to misrepresent the costs they report upward to government officials for reimbursement. (Earlier this year, a federal judge ruled that Amentum will remain a defendant as the lawsuit proceeds, though claims against other subcontractors were dismissed.)

In 2025, DynCorp, by then an Amentum subsidiary, paid $21 million to the federal government to settle a separate False Claims Act lawsuit over allegations of inflating costs associated with training Iraqi police officers prior to being acquired by Amentum.

“I don’t think Amentum cleaned up the DynCorp act,” Tiefer said. “The fact that they acquired DynCorp showed that they agreed that they wanted to take as many government contracts as possible, and make as much money off those contracts. That was the DynCorp way, and that was the Amentum way.” 

From the beginning, Amentum was heavily involved in operating Camp East Montana. 

Government records show that Acquisition Logistics entered into a $200 million subcontract with Amentum on July 16, 2025—two days before signing its contract to run Camp Montana with the Department of Defense, which originally set up the contract before it was transferred in October of that year to DHS. When an independent contractor suffered a heart attack early in the facility’s construction process, an Amentum representative—not one from Acquisition Logistics—was present during an investigation conducted by the Occupational and Safety and Health Administration, according to records obtained by the Texas Observer.

Investigators from the GAO found facility contractors spent up to $11.5 million in payments for facility services during a two-week period in early August before the first detainees arrived. Between August 16 and September 30, investigators identified at least $423,000 in wasted meal services and an additional $7.1 million which contractors supposedly spent on unnecessary food services from that October to March 2026. 

Meanwhile, several current and former detainees have said they experienced drastic weight loss due to the poor or inadequate meals inside the facility. One was held at Camp East Montana during the facility’s first 50 days and told the Washington Post that “he was fed cookies, candies and potato chips in lieu of meals.”

His detention at Camp East Montana overlapped with the time period in which the GAO report found the payments for unused meals. 

A class action lawsuit filed in May by the American Civil Liberties Union and other legal advocacy organizations contains harrowing accounts from former and current detainees of the conditions inside the facility. Many of their descriptions point to a pattern of cost-cutting practices which detainees have said amount to circumstances that are “in some respects even more punitive than prison,” even though immigrant detention is civil rather than criminal. 

A plaintiff in the lawsuit described a three-week period in which janitorial staff provided by one of the facility’s subcontractors failed to clean a sewage break, forcing detainees to use their own clothing to clean human feces from eating areas.

“We’re looking at conditions that are violating individuals’ constitutional rights to receive adequate healthcare, to receive food that is sufficient and that does not cause them to become ill,” said Charlotte Weiss, an immigration attorney based in El Paso who regularly visits clients at Camp East Montana. 

Amentum was awarded the contract to manage the detention center without competition in March. Four months later, ICE offered to extend the company’s no-bid contract, claiming the number of detainees and “the proprietary nature of its infrastructure” meant only Amentum was fit to manage the facility—though the company is less experienced in detention management than some private prison companies, which also manage ICE facilities.

“Amentum has been a close partner with ICE in managing Camp East Montana, and was best suited to take over as the prime government contractor for this facility,”a DHS spokesperson said in a statement to the Observer.

The DHS spokesperson stated further that the “new contractor will allow Camp East Montana to continue abiding by the highest detention standards WITH the ability to provide MORE medical care on-site. This contract also allows more on-site staff and a PRECISE quality assurance surveillance plan. ICE will have even more oversight of the contractors at this facility. Far from closing, Camp East Montana is upgrading.”

Acquisition Logistics declined to comment, and Amentum did not respond to requests from the Observer for an interview or statements. During a recent earnings conference call, John Heller, Amentum’s CEO, informed investors that “strong operating performance enabled higher-than-anticipated profitability” and identified contracts related to homeland security as an area of core growth.

According to Weiss, complaints about living conditions and infrastructure issues have persisted at Camp East Montana after Amentum took over the facility. “We have not seen any change that has happened … in fact, it seems like some aspects have been getting worse,” Weiss said. 

As Amentum stands to profit for months to come from its large government deal, detainees remain confined to windowless tents in the desert, breathing in dust while American taxpayers pay billions to oversee their confinement. 

The post ICE Contractor for Controversial Camp East Montana Is Trailed by Fraud Allegations appeared first on The Texas Observer.

The Year for Magical Thinking

posted in: All news | 0

By the beginning of the 2024 electoral cycle, I’d spent enough time as a progressive-leaning observer of Texas politics to have developed a certain telltale armor. No one was going to convince me that Colin Allred was about to succeed where Beto O’Rourke had failed, or that Texas was prepared to reject Trump. And, while it didn’t help a living soul get healthcare or a decent public education, that protection served me well in the bloodletting to come.

Yet today, dear reader, I must admit I feel cracks in the armor widening.

There are objective reasons for this. Polling from April to July showed James Talarico and Ken Paxton in essentially a dead heat for U.S. Senate (O’Rourke was polling down 7 points at the same time in his comparable bid). Talarico is out-fundraising Paxton three to one, while Trump is now even less popular than he was eight years ago. More Democrats than Republicans voted in the March primaries, and in Tarrant County a special election saw a state Senate seat swing 31 points toward the Dems. 

But belief is about more than falsifiable proof. There is an alchemy to it. My own internal journey may matter little, but on a mass scale the slow accretion of conviction matters greatly, and here the media plays a role. 

Which brings me to a body of work that I seem to see transforming in lockstep with my own shifting perspective—a body of work that is, well, a blog.

I remember “LivingBlueTX,” starting somewhere back in the COVID haze, as a fairly popular Twitter account (today co-opted by a right-wing troll) promoting and engaging in Texas Democratic politics. It was a spin-off of a well-followed Facebook page for suffering Lone Star liberals begun back in the tea party era. 

The account was run by Michelle Davis, who, as she explained in a recent podcast, was an Arlington-based corporate digital marketer and admin of the Facebook page in 2020 when she cashed out her retirement savings to strike out as an independent blogger and poster under the LivingBlue brand.

Two years later, she renamed her project “Lone Star Left” and transitioned to Substack, the newsletter platform home to much of today’s independent media, where she publishes at a near-daily clip under the slogan “Because facts have a left-wing bias.” The project would fit comfortably in the blog era of the earlier 21st century—she’s more writer than influencer. But she does have a sizable TikTok following, and she embraces the weird amalgamation that is Substack today by mixing in both live video and podcasts, getting significant guests including state House Democratic Caucus Chair Gene Wu, state Senator Roland Gutierrez, and a crush of Dem candidates during primary season.

Since the beginning of Trump’s second term, Davis’ audience has grown from around 4,000 subscribers to around 11,000 (which places her, on Substack, below former ag commish Jim Hightower but above that “Texas Paul” guy who does the selfie videos with the coffee mug). 

Beto O’Rourke in November 2018 (Nick Wagner/Austin American-Statesman via AP)

Until recently, I followed her output inattentively, but last summer a particular political intervention caught my eye.

At the time, Texas Dems seemed in the throes of a quintessential “disarray.” Erstwhile torchbearers O’Rourke and Allred were meeting with would-be successors Joaquin Castro and Talarico to supposedly coordinate a statewide slate for 2026—except they couldn’t agree on anything, a fact that soon got out to the press. Eventually, two of them jumped in the same race, and the other two did nothing.

To me, the whole thing was typical. They’re Texas Democrats; they’re going to lose, and they’re going to do it without much style or strategy. In other breaking news, Texas summers are hot.

But Davis took a tack that struck me as bizarre. First, she did a rally write-up in which she lavishly praised (minus Allred) the whole indecisive pack of men as leaders of an insurgent, progressive-populist, anti-D.C. political party on the verge of being unleashed—an assessment that bore little resemblance to any Texas Democratic Party I knew of. Then she published a letter cosigned by party activists calling on the men to sort themselves out in a specific way. They didn’t listen, but, in what I now know is her usual fashion, Davis kept on undeterred.

Going back to 2022, the Lone Star Left blog is defined by a deranged optimism. For a concrete example: Just six months after the ’22 midterms—which, at best, were a non-disaster for Democrats—Davis predicted that Dems could flip 17 state House seats in 2024. (The GOP actually added two seats.)

From the beginning, Davis, who also self-describes as a millennial mom, mixed such electoral punditry with coverage of the minutiae of the state party organization itself. She was a strident critic of former longtime party chair Gilberto Hinojosa. She explained the work of precinct chairs and called on her readers to fill the party’s numerous vacancies. She championed the Progressive Caucus within the party, and she treated the writing of the official 2024 state party platform as a marquee event.

“The platform that the Party passed was the most Progressive Platform in history,” she wrote in June 2024, noting that Texas Democrats were the first in the country to call for a ceasefire in Gaza. Cynics like me felt that, unlike in blue states, pro-Palestine leftists had succeeded here largely because of the low stakes of what this particular party says it believes. But Davis, a self-identified progressive, treats the platform as a barometer of what both the base and the mass of nonvoting Texans want, and she judges Democratic politicians by their divergence from it. (A bit more like what you see on the GOP activist side.)

Lone Star Left also issues endorsements in the manner that Republicans believe Philadelphians vote: early and often. And her track record is, to put it charitably, mixed. She has a soft spot for a type of lefty candidate who comes in roughly fifth in a five-way primary. And time has proved unkind to some of her broader predictions as well, including from August 2024: “Lina Hidalgo is a rising star within the Democratic Party,” and, “In my mind, Jasmine Crockett has already won her 2026 bid against John Cornyn.”

As November 2024 approached—like a movie serial killer behind a protagonist who just won’t stop chatting on the phone—Davis kept caution firmly in the wind. “Election Eve prediction from Lone Star Left: Colin Allred will win,” she wrote.

We all recall how those elections went instead, but I suspect few of us can claim quite the bounce-back of Lone Star Left. Within hours, Davis advised: “In the shadow of defeat, we can find our strength.” Two days later, she assessed that Dems, including Allred, had veered too far right and abandoned the base, which in turn had abandoned them.

As the forces of centrism geared up nationwide to push the opposite narrative, she barreled ahead, cranking back to life her highly specific prediction machine, forecasting that Dems could flip up to 30 state House seats this November and that they would nab multiple statewide offices.

All that probably sounds like a willful refusal to let facts intrude on a chosen narrative, and it probably is. And yet, the winds of reality seem to be shifting her way.

Gina Hinojosa on July 18 in Lubbock (AP Photo/Justin Rex)

Take the latest Texas Democratic Party convention as evidence. For months, a minor brouhaha had been simmering after the recently appointed chair, a self-styled populist and progressive named Kendall Scudder, moved the party headquarters to his hometown of Dallas. Some party staffers were upset by the move, and this bubbled over into a couple of Dems-in-disarray-style articles in the Texas Tribune. Davis threw down, in blog form, for Scudder—saying her fellow North Texan had made the right move in pivoting the party away from Austin and was pursuing the right strategy of filling empty precinct chair positions and fielding a candidate in every legislative district (which the party achieved). Of the malcontents, she said, Scudder “should have cleaned house immediately after taking office.”

When the party convention arrived this June—which Davis covered in more minute detail than anyone else—the conflict came to a head in a race for chair that Scudder won with an overwhelming 75 percent of the vote. At the same time, Bernie Sanders-affiliated candidates are winning primaries around the country, and party mandarins are wringing their hands about rising socialism as Republicans increasingly resign themselves to a wretched midterm. It’s a state of affairs that Davis anticipated much more so than, to name one observer, me.

In my binge-read of Lone Star Left, one post jumped out as unlike the rest. “Lying in a hospital bed with nothing but fluorescent lights and a blood pressure cuff for company will make a person think,” Davis wrote last June, describing a very recent “health hiccup” she was recovering from. “I realized this was the first time in years I’d gone four whole days without sending a newsletter. … I started thinking about why I do this in the first place.”

She reported how readers write to her saying that, because of her work, they became precinct chairs, hosted a forum, or became voter registrars. And that’s her reason. “We’re Texans,” she added in a concluding call to arms. “We don’t wait for miracles. We make them.”

Well, dammit, maybe so. Just because you haven’t seen a thing doesn’t mean it’s not unfolding before your eyes.  

The post The Year for Magical Thinking appeared first on The Texas Observer.

Mexico’s Deportation Capital

posted in: All news | 0

Editor’s Note: This story was co-published with Puente News Collaborative  a bilingual nonprofit newsroom, convener and funder dedicated to high-quality, fact-based news and information from the U.S.-Mexico border. 

Just days after United States immigration agents detained Daniel Ramirez last month near his home in Brownsville, the 30-year-old Texas resident found himself shackled to a thinly cushioned seat on a deportation flight with other Mexican nationals. He listened to the pre-flight safety instructions with some skepticism. 

“How are we going to put the life saver on if we have handcuffs on our hands and feet?” he remembered another detainee asking.

But the shackles would turn out to be the least of the discomforts on this flight. Instead of being expelled to his native Mexico, Ramirez and his countrymen were flown to Guatemala City, joining a parade of at least 2,200 deported Mexicans transferred this year to Guatemala—part of the U.S.’s third-country deportation agenda. To Ramirez and critics of President Donald Trump, the third-country drop-offs make the journeys home more difficult and dangerous for detainees; final insults to migrants rounded up in a campaign to remove every undocumented person in the U.S.

Felipe Flores, deported alongside Ramirez, described the policy as “negligent.” He said that after days in cramped U.S. detention facilities, unable to shower or brush his teeth, and then a 15-hour stint in handcuffs, it was a relief to be out of immigration custody.

However, after crossing back into Mexico from Guatemala, both men struggled with the prospect of an expensive, multi-day bus journey in a part of the country they barely know. Ramirez’s trip, ironically, would deliver him to Matamoros, on Mexico’s border with Texas.

“It’s like a punishment for us so we don’t go back again,” said Ramirez, who was born in Mexico’s Tamaulipas state, but raised in Brownsville, just across the border in Texas. He and Flores spoke to Puente News recently about their deportations inside a teeming bus station in Tapachula. 

Previous administrations almost never deported people to countries that they have no connection to, but after changes to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policy in early 2025, ICE began regularly carrying out such transfers worldwide. Of an estimated 22,000 people deported to third countries during the second Trump administration, around 19,000 have been to Mexico. Many end up in Tapachula, a city of 400,000 that has emerged as a bustling Ground Zero for thousands of migrants and refugees from around the world. 

Mexico’s migration agency, which has been working with the Trump administration to receive deportees, nonetheless said deporting Mexican citizens to Guatemala was a move to make it difficult to re-enter U.S. territory.

“The Mexican government has communicated to U.S. authorities its opposition to this practice and reiterated that every Mexican person has the right to enter national territory,” the Mexican government said in a press release on August 20.

In response to questions about the deportation of Mexican citizens to Guatemala, a DHS spokesperson wrote, “The Trump Administration is utilizing all lawful options to carry out the largest deportation operation in history, just as President Trump promised.”

After the deportation flight dropped Ramirez in Guatemala’s capital city, authorities bussed him to Mexico’s southern border. Mexican authorities then released him in Tapachula. Before buying a bus ticket to his grandmother’s hometown of Matamoros in Mexico’s state of Tamaulipas, Ramirez reflected on the journey ahead:

“I’m like a thousand pesos short,” he said. “I’ll be driving for like three days. Sitting down in a bus. It’s bad.”

In the last decade, Tapachula, the second-largest city in Mexico’s Chiapas state, has received refugees fleeing gang violence in Haiti and Honduras, hunger in Venezuela and Cuba, and wars and political persecution in countries across the globe. And here, in the shadow of the Tacaná Volcano that marks the meeting of Central and North America, human movement clashes with Mexico’s own increasingly militarized anti-migration policies designed to discourage migrants from traveling north to wealthier states or the U.S. border.

Daniel Ramirez follows nine other Mexican citizens who were deported to Guatemala onto a bus bound for Mexico City on August 21, 2026. (Photo by Georgina Pease for Puente News Collaborative)

Since January of 2025, thousands of Mexican nationals—including unaccompanied children—and third-country transfers mainly from Cuba, Venezuela, and Central America have been deported on planes and buses directly to the city. 

“Both countries are following a similar deterrence logic – keep people as far away from the Mexico-U.S. border as possible to avoid recidivism,” said Gretchen Kuhner, Director of the Institute for Women in Migration, in an email to Puente News. 

The U.S. has long coordinated deportations with—and exerted pressure on —the Mexican government to extend prevention by deterrence policies. After a spike in migration from Central America in 2014, Mexico’s Programa Frontera Sur—the Southern Border Program—used U.S. funding for more checkpoints and deportations of non-Mexicans.

The program helped create a bottleneck: Central Americans, even many already deported from the U.S. and Mexico, have crossed back to Tapachula. They’ve joined an estimated 50,000 people from around the world unable to move farther north into Mexico because of increased checkpoints and arduous waits for visa decisions and applications for refugee status.

In Tapachula, they contemplate their futures. Some still hope to reach the U.S.-Mexico border; many say they can’t return to their native countries, while others consider making Mexico their new home.

The influx and containment of migrants in Tapachula strains infrastructure, refugee services and job markets, said Denisse Lugardo Escobar, Tapachula’s Director of International Relations and Cross-Border Development. City, state, and federal authorities and international organizations provide migrants with work opportunities and legal advice. But “the demand is too much,” she said. “It’s like putting more and more water in a bottle. At some point it’s going to spill, it’s going to overflow and I keep pouring more water but it doesn’t fit,” Lugardo added.

On the day Ramirez was released, hundreds of migrants gathered in Tapachula’s Parque Bicentenario under a light rain, behind a banner with hand-painted blue and black lettering reading “Sueños sin Fronteras” – Dreams without Borders.

José David Murcia Valdez carried two light backpacks slung over his shoulders and gripped the handlebars of a small black mountain bike that he hoped would carry him back to Monterrey, northern Mexico’s industrial center, about 150 miles from the Texas border. The 30-year-old fled Honduras six years ago after suffering a machete attack that cost him a finger and left a network of scars covering his arms and shoulders. He made it to Monterrey and for three years held a steady job at a recycling plant – until Mexican migration authorities arrived to check employees’ papers. 

“They dumped me back in Honduras, but I can’t go to my country because of the machete attack,” said Murcia Valdez, whose earlier refugee application in Tapachula had been denied. “As soon as I got there I turned around and came back again, but in Tapachula things are very difficult for us, for migrants.”

Migrants leave Tapachula in a caravan on August 20, 2026. (Photo by Georgina Pease for Puente News Collaborative.)

His next option was the Sueños sin Fronteras caravan—the fourth one organized this year in Tapachula. By traveling in a large group, migrants seek to reduce the risk of detention and of being targeted by organized crime.

“What we want more than anything is to be a little further north, where there’s work,” Murcia Valdez said.

But hope fizzled quickly. Just 30 miles from Tapachula, some people turned back exhausted and hungry. Mexican authorities bussed others back to Tapachula, what many migrants now call a “prison city.”

Murcia Valdez said that the last time he’d walked out of Tapachula in a caravan it disintegrated in Oaxaca, and migration authorities returned him south. This time, after a few days on the road, Murcia Valdez and the remaining members of the Sueños sin Fronteras caravan had logged 62 miles—still inside Chiapas state borders.

“I’ll get there,” Murcia Valdez said. “I have faith, and I trust God. If he’s kept me alive, it’s for a purpose.”

Daniel Ramirez’s Mexican citizenship saved him the travail of a caravan. Instead, it was a costly days-long bus ride back to Tamaulipas, just across the Rio Grande from the Texas home he can’t return to.

Migrants leave Tapachula in a caravan on August 20, 2026. (Photo by Georgina Pease for Puente News Collaborative)

Ramirez said he knew that without documentation in the U.S., it would be hard to find work after years of schooling and off-the-books odd jobs. With no viable path to legal status, he also lived with the fear of being deported to Mexico, a country he had only vague memories of. What’s made his deportation experience worse, though, is the sting of being dumped first in Guatemala, a country he has no connection to, and then left to his own devices in southern Mexico, nearly 1,300 miles from his birthplace.

“It’s wrong, you know. It’s bad,” he said.

Ramirez will stay on the Mexican side of the wall. He said he doubts he’ll test an increasingly hard border that’s become “basically impossible” to cross.

In Matamoros, he’s already found work painting cars and plans to write a book he’ll self-publish.

“I don’t want to go back because I don’t need it,” Ramirez said. “I’ve got my own way to make money; I don’t need to go over there.”

The post Mexico’s Deportation Capital appeared first on The Texas Observer.

The Last Mayor of Houston

posted in: All news | 0

On his second Saturday as the 63rd mayor of Houston, former state Senator John Whitmire drove to Yale Street Grill, a no-frills diner in the Heights neighborhood, to rendezvous with Bill King, a former Houston Chronicle columnist and current fellow at Rice University’s Baker Institute, who, in 2015, had very nearly become mayor himself. 

Whitmire’s schedule was packed. In the first two weeks of January 2024, he’d already convened with many a city and county official; sworn in the new members of the Houston Police Officers’ Union (HPOU) board; ordered an end to the city’s eight-year labor dispute with the firefighters’ union; twice hosted discussions with the conservative nonprofit Crime Stoppers of Houston; and received measurements for a bulletproof vest. Amid the clamor, Whitmire was asking a friend for advice: Which of the city’s problems should he try to tackle first? 

Shortly before Whitmire announced his bid for mayor, King, who previously ran for mayor twice, had offered Whitmire his honest assessment: “I don’t think the city’s problems can be fixed anymore.”


Advertisement

At the time, Whitmire drawled, “Oh, don’t tell me that.” But having now spent a moment under the hood, the city was apparently in worse condition than either had imagined. 

At root was the problem of revenue—too many payments out, too few deposits in—combined with a beleaguered tax base. “We’ve already got an affordability problem. We’ve got one of the highest water rates in the state; we’ve got high property tax rates already,” King told the Texas Observer. One of Whitmire’s most pressing tasks would be to avoid a deficit while maintaining city services, at a time when Houstonians’ confidence in the economy has now plummeted more in a single year than at any time since the 1980s oil bust. With one in five Houstonians living under the poverty line, the highest rate among large U.S. cities, the prevailing sentiment is that the “Golden Buckle of the Sunbelt” has lost its sheen. 

In his campaign for mayor, Whitmire cast the legacy of his two-term predecessor, Sylvester Turner, another former Lege Democrat, as the reason for the city’s many ills—from the budget and the post-pandemic increase in crime to supposedly excessive biking infrastructure. By comparison, Whitmire’s actual opponent, the iconic Houston Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee, seemed like almost an afterthought. Whitmire won in a landslide December runoff through a hodgepodge coalition of suburbanites, Latinos, MAGA Republicans, and organized labor, particularly the police and firefighters, attesting to Whitmire’s self-image as a dealmaker. He even touted his working relationship with Republican state leadership, forged during his decades as a state senator, after such relations had deteriorated under Turner. “I’ve told Austin, we’re all in this together,” he informed the New York Times. “How Houston goes is how the state of Texas goes, and that’s just a fact.” 

Theoretically, if Houston’s problem were only who sat in the mayor’s office, a well-experienced and well-connected pol like Whitmire, who became the “dean” of the Texas Senate after serving since 1983, would be well positioned to reverse the city’s fortunes. It’s the only major city in Texas with a strong mayor system—and arguably the strongest of such systems in the country. The mayor here holds executive authority and appoints, removes, and oversees all administrative department heads—and, unlike other strong mayors, also controls the city council’s agenda and presides over it as a voting member. 

But anyone aware of state Republicans’ penchant for anti-local control laws (never mind Texas Governor Greg Abbott’s recent appetite for pulling public safety grants) knows the dynamic Whitmire described to the Times runs the other way around. As the rulers of Texas go, so must go Houston. And when it isn’t Abbott, it’s the Trump administration: sending oil prices spiraling, gutting the National Weather Service, and dispatching masked U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents in unmarked vehicles.

In an emailed statement to the Observer, Whitmire’s office said: “It is undeniable that the city has a more fruitful relationship than in previous administrations, but policy disagreements between the city and state will always persist.”

Whitmire at the Capitol in 2019 (Kolten Parker)

While the mayor’s local purview may be unmatched, Houston’s regional mandate in the greater metropolitan area is waning. Once the fastest-growing city in the country, Houston’s year-to-year population growth rate has nosedived, with the locus shifting to the outer suburbs. Municipal resources are stretched thin across the city’s more than 670 square miles of territory, and frequent disputes over funding streams and responsibilities break out between the City of Houston, Harris County, and the regional planning bodies such as the Houston-Galveston Area Council (H-GAC). The region’s municipal governing apparatus is effectively “a series of solutions stacked on top of one another from different eras, creating a feudalistic funding policy, particularly on the infrastructure front,” said Michael Moritz, a longtime Houston resident and one of the plaintiffs suing the city for refusing to enact a voter-approved charter amendment requiring Houston to renegotiate for more-democratic representation on H-GAC.

This quagmire didn’t start with Turner and likely won’t end with Whitmire. And Houstonians themselves appear obliquely aware that, for all its statutory power, the mayoralty is a bit of a paper tiger. At least, that’s what’s implied at the ballot box: “You typically see higher voter turnout in strong mayor systems because the office of the mayor is perceived as more important,” said James Vanderleeuw, professor of city administration at Park University. Houston’s mayoral turnout is still several points higher than “weak mayor” cities like Dallas and Fort Worth (Austin, a weak mayor outlier, recently shifted to scheduling mayoral elections in presidential years), but that’s leaping a low bar. When compared with its strong mayor city peers like New York and Atlanta over the past four mayoral cycles, Houston’s overall voter turnout ranked dead last. Just 17 percent of the city’s registered voters cast a ballot for their top municipal executive in November 2023, and fewer still (just around 200,000) showed up to make the final decision in the December runoff. 

Taken altogether, Whitmire is a nominally “strong” mayor with a relatively meager voter mandate, presiding over a once-mighty fiefdom in decline. And while Houston is no stranger to tragedy, he appears hardly able to confront the torrent of problems washing over his city. Municipal procedure here has for years been captured by the “task force” that goes nowhere, the “committee” that solves nothing. In those all-too-brief moments when the council chambers suddenly show signs of life, state Republicans are quick to intervene. How, then, did the strongest mayor in America become so weak? And even if Whitmire could get his way, what would that way look like? 

After graduating in 1968 from Waltrip High School (a roughly five-minute drive from the Yale Street Grill), Whitmire entered the Great Society—that is, while studying political science at the University of Houston, he got a job with Texas’ welfare department. 

That department was, at the time, buoyed by the largesse of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty, in many ways the last gasp of the New Deal order. Where the feds intended to finance a selection of “community action programs” within underserved Black and brown neighborhoods, Houston’s mayor, Louie Welch, had outmaneuvered them by forcing a merger between the city’s existing welfare services and the program’s local planning committee. His handpicked board, which featured a “predominance of millionaires,” quickly co-opted the funds and dispensed them at will, drawing concern from federal officials about what was known internally as the “Houston situation.”

To the city’s elite, “community action” meant rabble-rousing. Black residents of the northeastern neighborhood of Settegast, for example, had recently entered Houston’s typically muted City Hall to demand improvements to the sewage system to address contaminated drinking water. For Welch, who styled himself a civil rights moderate, this was embarrassing—and couldn’t happen again. To ensure nothing smelled of “revolution,” Welch’s explicitly stated fear, he and the police chief worked hand in glove to surveil pastors and activists and ply informants within the region’s welfare system. 

It was a critical period. Whitmire, whose job was to conduct unannounced compliance interviews with food stamp recipients, had a front-row seat to the War on Poverty’s collapse. By invoking the specter of outside agitators (who would today be cast as “paid protesters”), Welch had effectively defied the federal government through an alliance with the local police, demonstrating a model of strong mayor governance that appealed to Houston’s elites.

In 1973, when Whitmire ascended to the Texas House as a 23-year-old state representative, what remained under Mayor Welch—the first of nine Houston mayors that Whitmire worked with over his political career—was a sweeping surveillance regime, paternalistic management of Houston’s poor, and tight-gripped command over allotted state and federal dollars. Meanwhile, from the 1940s to the ’60s, the city had already quadrupled its land area through annexation. With no state income tax on the books, and since wealthy white enclaves within Houston incorporated as their own “cities” to avoid racial integration, these property tax infusions were the Bayou City’s best way to pull in revenue in the short term. That is, until those annexed communities started demanding clean water and trash pickup. 

Whitmire speaks during an April city council meeting considering whether to repeal the newly approved proposal limiting cooperation with ICE. (Raquel Natalicchio/ Houston Chronicle via AP)

Whitmire’s next decade in the Lege was so inconsequential that he “couldn’t get a clean seat in the bathroom,” a lobbyist once told the Houston Post, and little changed even after he jumped to the Texas Senate in 1982. With his muddy drawl and thinning hair, which slowly yielded to his now-standard Elmer Fudd likeness, he earned the nickname “Boogie” thanks to his penchant for partying and his zippered “boogie-woogie” ankle boots. He built a reputation as a reliable moderate Dem, quick to follow when the power players called, and received his first big break in 1993, when his mentor, the boisterous Texas Lieutenant Governor Bob Bullock, tapped him to chair the Senate Criminal Justice Committee. There, he essentially built upon Welch’s example on a statewide scale, authoring a sweeping rewrite of the state’s criminal code and, concurrently, spurring Texas’ prison construction boom. 

With a $2.5 billion price tag at the time, the build-out became one of the largest public works projects in the country. This was a different kind of war on poverty, a dark refraction of New Deal-style initiatives. While the country’s social safety net frayed and Texas cities stretched their territory, the prison expansion produced tens of thousands of jobs, from construction to policing to corrections staffing, and compounded local leaders’ sense of control. In the 1990s, the Houston Police Department (HPD)’s full-time staff also grew by more than 30 percent. Already a longtime force in city politics, HPD now had greater numbers and, thus, more political power than ever. If the police were once a junior partner in the mayor’s plans, they soon became major stakeholders in their own right, another force the mayor would have to concede to if he wanted to keep his job.

Senator Whitmire’s prison build-out was a quick-burning boon with long-term fiscal (not to mention humanitarian) consequences. By 2007, Texas was facing another $2 billion in costs to accommodate projections that the state would need an additional 17,000 beds in the next five years. Polishing his bipartisan bona fides once again, Whitmire worked with Republicans to outrun that price tag, pulling off what was hailed as a prize piece of criminal justice moderation and reform. But the result was actually more of a shell game: Texas still increased the number of prison beds but simply categorized them differently, dispersing costs across the budget without really rolling back incarceration rates. 

Twenty years later, as Whitmire faces another deficit—this time as a big-city mayor—it’s hard to see his most recent budget proposal without a sense of déjà vu. 

As of early May, Houston risked running a record-setting $174 million deficit, coming fresh off last year’s $832 million contract agreement with the Houston police union, which increased officer pay by more than 36 percent over the next five years—the city’s greatest expense and a fiscal headache for a mayor who is elsewhere proffering coolheaded austerity. 

Whitmire’s plan to meet the city’s deficit, approved by the city council in June, was essentially a sleight of hand. By shifting solid-waste operations from the general fund into the utility fund, then charging a new $5 “administrative fee” for garbage services, it merely closed the coming year’s fiscal gap without fixing structural revenue problems. Even as the budget passed, questions remained as to whether he may soon need to hike property taxes to make ends meet. “I don’t really dispute the fact that Whitmire’s going to have to do a property tax increase here at some point,” King told the Observer. “But every time you make it more expensive to live here, that’s more incentive for someone to leave.”

Generations of Houston mayors have approached their jobs with this fear top of mind. In the 1990s, after the city controversially absorbed the wealthy suburb of Kingwood, the state Legislature barred cities from certain types of annexations, meaning they could no longer capture revenue from their periphery. Then-mayor Bob Lanier and his predecessor, Kathy Whitmire (the widow of John’s brother), couldn’t agree on much, but as suburban influence grew, they both emphasized turning downtown into a “destination” to reel in White Flight-ers. 

Kathy’s tack involved adorning the area with cultural offerings, like the George R. Brown Convention Center construction project and a plan for a “straight-out-of-Buck-Rogers” monorail, as labeled in Texas Monthly. Soon after Kathy’s ouster, however, Lanier shredded her Houston Metro Transit Authority plan and instead boosted police presence downtown. The combined efforts hardly tamped the city’s bleeding. If anything, it got worse: Today, most population growth within Harris County isn’t in Houston proper. Since 1980, nearby Sugar Land’s population has increased by more than 1,100 percent, while Houston’s inner-loop population remains roughly the same as it was in 1970. (“The city remains the key to economic growth for the entire region,” Whitmire’s office insisted in its statement.) 

IT’S AMAZING HOW PEOPLE IN MEDIA SAY, ‘WHAT IS YOUR VISION?’

Facing this long-standing crisis, Whitmire has mixed and matched the approaches of his ’90s-era predecessors. Like Lanier, he’s drastically expanded police funding. Like Kathy, he’s championed the expansion of the George R. Brown Convention Center. Like Lanier, he scrapped his predecessor’s transit plan, and like Kathy, his “straight-out-of-Buck-Rogers” alternatives have flitted from “water taxis” on the bayou, which he proposed during his annual State of the City address, to stretching Houston’s embattled light-rail system to the airports.

That this contradictory set of priorities is so familiar doesn’t mean Whitmire’s reign has lacked a personal touch. In many ways, he’s brought the Lege back with him. His 2023 campaign manager, Diana Patiño, was his longtime staffer in Austin. Today, she’s his senior adviser and consultant—technically not on city payroll, but a mainstay around City Hall all the same. 

Patiño served as an adviser during the mayoral transition and “had a hand in selecting who was head of each city department,” one in-the-know Houston operative, who asked for anonymity for fear of reprisals, told the Observer. (Although Patiño has been Whitmire’s “trusted advisor,” his office said that he selected his department directors himself.) Those interested in speaking to the mayor, from politically connected donors to vendors looking for an edge with the city, often go through Patiño, the source said. Her office on Baldwin Street, about five minutes from City Hall, hosts a campaign office for Whitmire, replete with his Senate-era memorabilia—including his old chair and desk—and old photos covering the walls. It’s where Whitmire goes to hold private meetings, the source added, away from prying eyes. 

In an emailed statement, Patiño said that the office was necessary for modern political operations, like the Houston mayoralty, which require a “year-round presence.” (Alan Bernstein, Turner’s director of communications from 2017 to 2019, said, “If Turner maintained a campaign space for the duration of his first term, I certainly wasn’t aware of it.”) She added that Whitmire had “never met with vendors” there, and “on the few occasions he has visited the office, it has been to meet with his campaign team to discuss political matters.” 

Thus far, Whitmire’s greatest win circumvented local politics almost entirely, transposing one of his top municipal priorities to the familiar grounds of the state Capitol. Beginning in the spring of 2024, his housing czar, Mike Nichols, who formerly led the region’s Coalition for the Homeless nonprofit for five years, began privately showcasing Whitmire’s plan to “end street homelessness” in his first term, according to a slideshow acquired through a public records request. Under Mayor Turner, the goal had been to “end chronic homelessness” (that is, people who have been living on the streets for more than a year or who have been repeatedly unhoused), but under Whitmire, the chosen term of art was less academic. Police would, per the slideshow, “systematically transition individuals off the streets,” with the help of probate courts, adult protective services, and other outreach teams, to “restore public spaces for community enjoyment.” They only needed funding—and a green light from the state.

That October, alongside officials from Austin and San Antonio, the City of Houston delivered a list of big-city priorities for the Senate State Affairs Committee’s consideration—some admirable, some not. Among them were to expand Medicaid, seal eviction records so tenants could avoid landlords’ blacklists, create new revenue streams for a state homelessness fund, and “enhance the ability of law enforcement and crisis response teams” by broadening language around involuntary commitment. Adding weight to his request, Nichols explained in a letter to the committee that Downtown Houston+, an umbrella of local development groups, and the Greater Houston Partnership (the region’s 12-county chamber of commerce) “shared with me that homelessness is their members’ most significant concern.” 

The Legislature, of course, ignored the pleas for funding but pounced on the involuntary commitment component. Per a draft bill obtained through a public records request to Nichols’ office, an initial proposal to the Lege stated that a police officer would merely need “evidence that a person is homeless and has been for at least 12 months or on at least 4 separate occasions in the last 3 years” and has an “inability to provide for basic personal needs,” such as “food” and “shelter,” to qualify for involuntary detention. (Nichols told the Observer he didn’t support this draft.)

The language that eventually passed into law with bipartisan support, taking effect in September 2025, was more modest, making anosognosia, or the inability to recognize one’s own psychiatric condition, grounds for commitment. Yet even here, the Whitmire administration had successfully lobbied to broaden the bill’s scope, removing requirements that the persons pose an “imminent danger” to themselves. 

“It is inhumane to allow anyone, especially someone experiencing a severe mental health crisis, to continue living and deteriorating on the streets without intervention,” Nichols said in response to questions for this story. 

Perhaps more telling, though, is Whitmire’s greatest loss—that is, when his mandate to govern appeared shakiest. After a monthslong campaign led by local immigrant advocacy groups, Whitmire had been forced to act locally, first by finally acknowledging that HPD was cooperating with ICE during traffic stops and then by reluctantly voting in favor of a city council measure reducing police discretion to do so. It was an almost perfect inversion of the involuntary commitment push.

(Illustration by Raúl Arias)

The reaction from state Republicans was swift. Governor Abbott threatened to pull $114 million in public safety grants from Houston, much of it earmarked for the upcoming World Cup games, and fired salvos at Austin and Dallas for having previously enacted similar ordinances. Texas cities’ budgetary woes became a way for Abbott to hold cities hostage, but Whitmire went far beyond grudging negotiations. On April 22, the city council voted 13-4 in favor of amendments cowritten by Whitmire and Abbott’s staff, which essentially reverted the language to what it was before the controversy. At-large council member Alejandra Salinas called it the “Abbott Amendment.”

In a way, the saga proved one of the theses of Whitmire’s mayoralty: that resistance to the state is futile. But the episode also left him politically exposed on all sides. This is a problem past leaders, like Turner, would have addressed by signaling alignment with activists while carefully avoiding any too-meaty challenge to the governor. Whitmire, on the other hand, simply failed to appease the public, exposing both his inability to enact people’s demands and, worse, his reluctance to try. In its statement, Whitmire’s office disagreed, saying that “his administration navigated a political firestorm and came to an agreement” that kept Houstonians safe and compliant with state and federal laws.

Facing mounting dissent, Whitmire and his administration have grown leery of traditional public relations strategies. Today, the septuagenarian mostly turns to social media, his office’s preferred mode of communicating with voters, without the traditional middlemen. His office produces its own podcast, 901 Bagby: Inside The Mayor’s Office, in which Whitmire discusses the city’s goings-on with former KPRC 2 anchor Owen Conflenti. While he still sits for the occasional TV news one-on-one and seems eager to disseminate various podcast interview clips, the mayor didn’t respond to Houston Chronicle requests for comment for almost a year, nor did his office grant the Observer’s request for an interview for this story.

Meanwhile, what Whitmire calls “pop-up protests” such as No Kings Day weigh heavily on him. He’s brought them up during multiple television appearances and on his podcast, often unprompted. Like Mayor Welch, when facing dissent, Whitmire has levied the paid protesters canard: In 2024, he said the pro-Palestine protesters pressing him to pass a ceasefire resolution and divest from Israeli bonds were “being paid by Iran.” 

This predictably did nothing to quell the protests, though the resolution push did fizzle out. In the meantime, Whitmire’s team has mostly resorted to passively monitoring the situation: Through a $620,000 contract with Zencity, a controversial AI-powered data firm based in Tel Aviv, cofounded by a veteran of Israeli military intelligence, the city has expanded its usage of all kinds of aggregated, publicly available real-time data—from hyperlocal social media posts, including Nextdoor data, to 311 complaints—to score each council district on levels of satisfaction. 

Zencity’s mission is “to bring community voices into government decision-making,” as its co-founder and CEO, Eyal Feder-Levy, said in an emailed statement to the Observer. In other municipalities, it’s been used to monitor online discussion following police shootings. But the core of Zencity’s Houston work, which Feder-Levy said started under Turner and expanded under Whitmire, is “running representative community surveys.” It’s essentially an über-granular pollster, gauging residents’ opinions on everything from e-scooters and homelessness to public transportation and Whitmire’s handling of the ICE ordinance. A March Zencity report assessed online reception of Whitmire’s “pragmatic ‘follow the law’ stance,” i.e., kowtowing to Abbott, apparently finding that it tested well, except among those engaging with “direct testimonies in Spanish-language media.” 

Feder-Levy added: “Zencity is not surveillance on any level,” pointing to the company’s code of conduct. “Our Listen module, which aggregates publicly available comments from online sources in a completely anonymous way, was especially built to be even more secure than regular off-the-shelf social monitoring tools used by most brands.” 

Patiño, Whitmire’s adviser and former campaign manager who attended some meetings between the city and the firm, said Zencity is used to “monitor public sentiment and not to gauge electoral support,” and Whitmire’s office clarified: “The City does not use public resources for campaign purposes.”

Still, for an old pol like Whitmire, outsourcing outreach into Houston’s far-flung corners could be easier than relying on the Chronicle to temper public opinion. It’s a far cry from Welch’s more clandestine methods—tracking activists, working with informants—but by siphoning resources into monitoring localized reactions to problems rather than comprehensively addressing the problems themselves, Whitmire can boost the information at his disposal as he gears up for a 2027 reelection bid, while the city’s structural issues go mostly unchanged. 

No “Listen module” was necessary to register Houstonians’ outrage after ICE killed 52-year-old construction worker Lorenzo Salgado Araujo in July of this year. Yet, once again, Whitmire was caught flat-footed. After all but throwing up his hands and telling the grieving public an independent investigation was impossible, he dolefully joined the district attorney’s efforts to pursue exactly that. The unwashed masses had forced his hand once more.

What happens next, as of early August, remains an open question. The Texas Rangers are involved in the investigation now, at Abbott’s behest, while the Trump administration has since ordered the FBI to limit its scrutiny of ICE agents. The day after a tense public comment session at City Hall, during which speakers implored Whitmire to take further action after he joined the investigation, he scolded them for “using this tragedy” for “political purposes.” Several council members looked shocked at his inability to read the room, but this was par for the course. Whitmire often rails against what he terms “politics”: a simple, if clunky, way to signal that posturing isn’t his thing. But this is itself a political posture, and, needless to say, a mayor holds a political position.

Whitmire and Police Chief J. Noe Diaz last September in Houston (Marcus Ingram/Sipa USA via AP)

In good times, the relationships among the city, county, and state may work as described in a civics class, but these are not good times. Cowed as the council remains under Houston’s strong mayor system, it’s still prone to bouts of insubordination. Likewise, GOP state leaders have demonstrated that they’re interested only in using Whitmire to advance their own ends, and while he may see HPD as his best (and arguably last) ally, the police, too, are capable of going rogue. Immediately after the initial anti-ICE cooperation vote, HPOU president Douglas Griffith appeared to pull the union’s endorsement of Whitmire, telling Houston Public Media that the mayor’s support for the ordinance “blew me away.” And days after Araujo was killed, the Chronicle reported that HPD had continued collaborating with ICE, even as the city briefly limited its ability to do so, at least nominally defying the mayor’s authority. 

Griffith ended up swiftly walking back his statement, and—nearly 18 months before Houston’s next mayoral election—HPOU’s PAC unanimously endorsed Whitmire for reelection. Griffith’s comedy of manners betrayed a simple truth: Few Texas Democrats today are as enmeshed with the police lobby as Whitmire. He needed them, but they also needed him. 

About three months before the conflicts over Trump’s ICE acutely tested his mandate to govern, Whitmire ventured over to the friendly terrain of another local podcast aficionado, Tony Buzbee, the flamboyant trial attorney and ex-mayoral candidate (bested by Turner). “You know, it’s amazing how people in media say, ‘What is your vision?’” Whitmire said. After listing several accomplishments, such as “transforming downtown,” renovating the convention center, and “getting homeless in shelters”—initiatives that Houston’s mayors throughout history have cyclically leveraged to no avail—he trailed off, seeming to have forgotten his own rhetorical question. That many of these were “solved” through legislation in Austin appeared lost on him. Helping him along, Buzbee interjected: “I can sense a fire in you. It’s a good fire.” 

Whitmire agreed, saying he was about to put that fire to use. “I’m gonna leave here and probably go to work,” he said. 

But work toward what? Increasingly, it seems that even Whitmire’s not sure. While he might remove a bike lane or knock down an abandoned building to perform his authority now and then, real leadership has absconded elsewhere. And as the might of his office wanes, what should concern Houstonians even more is that—barring drastic change—he’ll still be more powerful than any of the city’s top executives to come. The suburbs will keep sprawling, and the soil will keep sinking, taking America’s strongest mayor down with it.  

The post The Last Mayor of Houston appeared first on The Texas Observer.